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The centre of global economic gravity has moved to the Asia-Pacific. 
The neglected and relatively poor Pacific end of the region is 
increasingly attracting the attention of outside powers as its 
neighbourhood has grown wealthier. In particular, China’s profile in 
the Pacific Islands has grown and has spurred a resurgence of 
American interest in the region. These developments have led a number 
of analysts to speculate about a new great-power competition being 
played out in the Pacific Islands.  
Placing China’s activities in the region in a geo-strategic paradigm 
akin to that of East Asia is, however, inappropriate and potentially 
counter-productive, obscuring an understanding of the transformative 
economic role China could play in the region. There is little evidence 
that China is doing anything more than supporting its commercial 
interests and pursuing South-South cooperation. Even if China has 
other ambitions, its ability to seriously challenge the dominant role of 
established powers such as Australia and the United States in the 
region is limited.  
Australia and the United States should cooperate with China in areas 
that support Pacific Island priorities rather than building any new 
security or diplomatic arrangements designed to compete with it. The 
goal should be to maximise the benefits of China’s new role in the 
region, while helping to minimise the negative consequences that do 
flow from some of China’s commercial and development activities in 
the Pacific Islands.  
JENNY HAYWARD-JONES 
Program Director 
The Myer Foundation Melanesia 
Program 
Tel: +61 2 8238 9037 
jhayward-jones@lowyinstitute.org 
LOWY INSTITUTE FOR 
INTERNATIONAL POLICY 
31 Bligh Street 
Sydney NSW 2000 
Tel: +61 2 8238 9000 
Fax: +61 2 8238 9005 
www.lowyinstitute.org 
M a y  2 0 1 3  A N A L Y S I S  
The Lowy Institute for International Policy is an independent policy think tank.  Its mandate 
ranges across all the dimensions of international policy debate in Australia – economic, political 
and strategic – and it is not limited to a particular geographic region.  Its two core tasks are to: 
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In early 2011 then United States Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton told the US Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee that the United 
States was in competition with China in the 
Pacific.  
 
Let's put aside the moral, humanitarian, do-
good side of what we believe in and let's 
just talk straight, realpolitik. We are in a 
competition with China. Take Papua New 
Guinea - huge energy find. Exxon Mobil is 
producing it. China is in there every day in 
every way trying to figure out how it's going 
to come in behind us, come in under us. 
They're supporting the dictatorial regime 
that unfortunately is now in charge of Fiji. 
They have brought all of the leaders of these 
small Pacific nations to Beijing, wined them 
and dined them. I mean, if anybody thinks 
that our retreating on these issues is 
somehow going to be irrelevant to the 
maintenance of our leadership in a world 
where we are competing with China, that is 
a mistaken notion.1 
 
The perception that China is in a geo-strategic 
competition with the United States for influence 
in the Pacific Islands region is not limited to 
Washington. In March 2013, two Pacific Island 
envoys to the United Kingdom talked of 
growing Chinese influence in an era of major-
power competition in the Pacific Islands region. 
Solo Mara, the Fiji High Commissioner to the 
United Kingdom, said in an address on 6 
March that Pacific Island countries ‘have for 
years been warned by metropolitan neighbours 
of China’s “questionable security intent” in the 
region’ and that China had filled a ‘vacuum’ 
left when the US and the UK withdrew and 
which Australia did not adequately fill.2 Winnie 
Kiap, the Papua New Guinea High 
Commissioner to the United Kingdom, said in 
an address on 19 March that the Pacific Islands 
region was ‘witnessing increased competition 
by major powers seeking strategic influence in 
the Asia-Pacific’ and that Papua New Guinea 
was ‘beginning to like China.’3 
 
This Analysis will argue that viewing China’s 
growing role in the Pacific from the perspective 
of geo-strategic competition is not only 
inappropriate, it is counter-productive. There is 
little strong evidence that China is doing much 
more than supporting its commercial interests 
and pursuing South-South cooperation in the 
region. Even if China’s intentions go beyond 
these interests, its ability to seriously challenge 
the role of longstanding powers in the region 
such as Australia and the United States is 
limited. Placing China’s activities into a geo-
strategic paradigm risks obscuring the bigger 
and potentially more transformative impacts – 
both positive and negative – of its commercial 
and aid activities in the region. The region’s 
established powers need to pursue a more 
sophisticated understanding of the real drivers 
of China’s recent activism in the Pacific Islands 
in order to avoid counter-productive policy and 
assist Pacific Island countries to maximise the 





At the Pacific Islands Forum Post-Forum 
Dialogue in Rarotonga in September 2012, 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced a 
new aid contribution of more than US$32 
million for economic development programs in 
the region. Clinton said the Pacific Islands 
region was strategically and economically vital 
and noted the security partnerships the US 
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Coastguard had with nine Pacific Island 
nations. While her speech was less explicit in its 
concern about China’s role in the Pacific than 
her 2011 statement, Clinton made plain 
America’s intention to have an enduring role in 
the region: 
 
We too, of course, are a Pacific nation. With 
that long history that many of you know so 
well, 70 years ago Americans made 
extraordinary sacrifices on many of the 
islands represented here. And we have since 
then underwritten the security that has 
made it possible for the people of this region 
to trade and travel freely. We have 
consistently protected the Pacific sea-lanes 
through which a great deal of the world’s 
commerce passes. And now we look to the 
Pacific nations in a spirit of partnership for 
your leadership on some of the most urgent 
and complex issues of our times such as 
climate change. Our countries are bound by 
shared interest, and more importantly, 
shared values, a shared history, and shared 
goals for our future. The United States is 
already invested in the Pacific. Indeed, we 
are increasing our investments and we will 
be here with you for the long haul. Here in 
the Pacific, and indeed across the world, the 
United States seeks a model of partnership 
rooted in our common values, but which 
delivers practical benefits and helps you 
create stronger economies and societies.4  
 
It is not the first time since the end of World 
War II that the Pacific Islands region has been 
seen as a theatre for geo-strategic competition. 
In the 1980s it briefly attracted the interest of 
the Soviet Union and Libya as part of Cold 
War strategic power plays. With that 
exception, however, the region has largely been 
ignored by the world’s great powers. In the 
1990s and first part of the 2000s, the region 
was mostly inwardly focused, concentrating on 
development challenges and a number of 
domestic security crises, including the 1989-
1998 Bougainville conflict, the 2000 and 2006 
coups in Fiji, the breakdown of law and order 
in Solomon Islands from 1999, and riots in 
Solomon Islands and Tonga in 2006. 
 
Clinton’s statements and growing US 
engagement raise the question of whether the 
region’s relative exclusion from great-power 
politics is about to change. Washington has 
become more cautious in public statements 
about the role of China in the Pacific Islands 
since Clinton’s 2011 statement. Clinton herself 
even noted in Rarotonga in 2012 that the 
Pacific was ‘big enough for all of us’, in 
response to suggestions that increased United 
States engagement in the region was a hedge 
against China’s growing influence.5 Clinton’s 
renewed focus on the Pacific Islands was also 
part of the Obama Administration’s so-called 
‘pivot’ or rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific, of 
which she and her Assistant Secretary of State 
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Kurt 
Campbell, were key champions. While it 
remains key to American policy in Asia, there is 
some question about the future of the pivot 
now that Clinton and Campbell have left office.  
 
Nevertheless, in private conversations, 
American, Australian and Japanese diplomats 
and military officers still allude to their 
concerns about the growing influence of China 
in the Pacific Islands, and its potential to 
challenge American and Australian supremacy 
and undermine the Western alliance in the 
region.6 The Australian Government’s first 
National Security Strategy (2013) refers to the 
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‘risk of another state seeking to influence 
Australia or its regional and global partners by 
economic, political or military pressure’.7 While 
the Strategy stops short of naming China as a 
strategic threat to Australian influence in the 
region, the implication was clear.  
 
The Australian Defence White Paper 2013 
labels the ‘growing reach and influence of 
Asian nations (which) opens up a wider range 
of external players for our neighbours to 
partner with’ as a ‘challenge’ in the South 
Pacific and cautions that Australia’s 
‘contribution to this region may well be 
balanced in the future by support and 
assistance provided by other powers’.8 The 
language of the White Paper is generally 
welcoming of China’s growing influence, and 
the Australian Government has elsewhere been 
supportive of China’s contribution to economic 
development in the region.9 But it is fairly clear 
there is still some concern about China as a 
potential geo-strategic threat, with the reference 
in the White Paper to Australia seeking to 
ensure ‘that no major power with hostile 
intentions establishes bases in our immediate 
neighbourhood from which it could project 
force against us.’10 Again, while it does not 
name China, this language at best sends a 
mixed message about Australia’s thinking 
regarding China’s intentions in the region.  
 
Concerns about China are also reflected in a 
growing body of academic and think tank 
literature. Ron Crocombe’s seminal 2007 book, 
Asia in the Pacific Islands: replacing the West 
argues there is a new strategic paradigm 
evolving in the region and Asian powers are 
taking ‘ever more important roles’ in it.11 
Crocombe suggested Pacific Island countries 
could shift allegiances from the Western 
Alliance to Northeast Asia or ASEAN, and 
claimed that Island states were part of a wider 
Asia-Pacific network that included military 
institutions.12 Joanne Wallis has suggested that 
the United States could engage with China in a 
‘concert of powers’ in the South Pacific in ways 
that would benefit broader Asia-Pacific stability 
and security.13 Craig Hooper and David M. 
Slayton, writing in the Proceedings of the US 
Naval Institute, suggest the Chinese Navy 
could launch military assets to rescue 
threatened nationals in the Pacific Islands in the 
future, thus posing a direct threat to United 
States interests in the region.14 The Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute’s Our near abroad: 
Australia and Pacific Islands regionalism 
argued the Asian century had given rise to 
strategic rivalry in the western Pacific.15 A 
Pacific Institute for Public Policy discussion 
paper, Patriot games: island voices in a sea of 
contest, contended that Pacific Island nations 
were caught in the middle of a new ‘great 
game’.16 Finally, Marc Lanteigne’s Water 
dragon? Power shifts and soft balancing in the 
South Pacific proposes the concept of soft 
balancing to describe geo-strategic competition 
in the Pacific Islands.17  
 
 
The China challenge? 
 
The Asia-Pacific region is now the most 
dynamic in the world, with a share of 
approximately 36 per cent of the world’s total 
gross domestic product.18 It is fair to say, 
however, that this dynamism has not yet really 
been reflected in the Pacific Islands part of the 
region. It comprises 22 countries and territories 
dispersed over an area of 48 million square 
kilometres and with a total population of over 
9 million people, approximately 7 million of 
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whom live in Papua New Guinea. All 14 of the 
independent states of the region are either 
developing or least developed countries. 
Average per capita income ranges from 
US$2,030 in Kiribati to US$25,373 in French 
New Caledonia.19 Papua New Guinea, Solomon 
Islands, Fiji and New Caledonia have a range 
of natural resources, while other island 
countries depend mainly on tourism, fisheries 
and remittances. For several countries, high 
transport costs and the absence of economies of 
scale limit the returns from agricultural 
exports. A number of the smaller countries in 
the region are aid dependent, probably in a 
permanent sense for some. The region is highly 
diverse in environmental, economic and 
cultural terms, but has developed a common 
sense of shared identity. 
 
China’s interests in the Pacific Islands prior to 
2008 were driven largely by its competition 
with Taiwan for diplomatic recognition. 
Taiwan is recognised by six states in the region 
and competed actively for the shifting loyalty of 
various Pacific Island states in a period of 
rampant chequebook diplomacy. That era 
ended when Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou 
proposed a diplomatic truce in 2008. This saw 
both Taiwan and China promise they would no 
longer seek to persuade states that already 
recognised the other to switch their recognition. 
Since that time, China’s increasing presence in 
the Pacific has been characterised by expanding 
trade, investment and aid ties with the region, 
driven by a diverse range of Chinese economic 
actors.  
 
For its part, China has been careful to say it is 
not in the Pacific Islands to compete with 
anyone. Chinese Vice Minister for Foreign 
Affairs Cui Tiankai told journalists at the 
Pacific Islands Forum in Rarotonga in 2012 
that:  
 
We are here in this region not to seek any 
particular influence, still less dominance. We 
are here to work with the island countries to 
achieve sustainable development because 
both China and the Pacific Island countries 
belong to the ranks of developing countries. 
China's assistance to other developing 
countries is in the framework of south-south 
cooperation so our origin, our policy 
approach and our practice are very different 
from those of the traditional donor 
countries. We are ready to exchange views, 
to compare respective practice and where 
possible and feasible, we're also open to 
work with them for the benefit of the 
recipient countries, particularly the island 
countries here in this region. We are here to 
be a good partner with the island countries; 
we are not here to compete with anybody.20 
 
As with Clinton’s remarks in Rarotonga, the 
Vice Minister’s remarks were intended to take 
the heat out of perceptions of competition 
between the United States and China. As is the 
case for many countries with interests in 
developing countries, the real drivers of 
Chinese commercial and aid activities in the 
Pacific Islands do not always reflect the 
altruism that Minister Cui describes. Moreover, 
as with the United States, the official Chinese 
government position is not necessarily reflected 
by statements made by representatives of the 
military. One Chinese military officer claimed 
in early 2013, for example, that the United 
States would be forced out of the Pacific by a 
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Mixed messages like this do not provide much 
reassurance about Chinese ambitions in the 
Pacific Islands and encourage conjecture about 
China’s geo-strategic goals in the region. But 
while it is true to say that China’s ambitions 
could change over time, conjecture around 
these ambitions needs to be firmly grounded in 
an understanding of the political constraints on 
China’s geo-strategic rise. As the Lowy 
Institute’s Linda Jakobson has noted, ‘China’s 
new leaders face pressing foreign policy 
challenges. They must maintain a constructive 
relationship with the United States, find a way 
to defuse tensions over sovereignty disputes 
with Japan and Southeast Asian nations, and 
manage ties with North Korea.’22 When 
managing China’s substantial domestic 
challenges is added to these, it seems unlikely 
that pursuing geo-strategic positioning in the 
Pacific Islands would be very high on Beijing’s 
agenda. 
 
Ultimately, one can only focus on what China 
is actually doing in the region today rather than 
what it might be doing tomorrow. When 
looked at from this perspective, the three main 
elements of China’s engagement with the region 
– trade and investment, aid, and diplomatic and 
military ties – provide, at best, a weak case for 
the argument that China has some grand geo-
strategic design. But even if China did have 
some ambitions in this regard, what a review of 
these three elements also underlines is how far 
China is from being able to challenge a well-
established order dominated by a number of 
key external powers with whom the countries 
of the region have long-standing and deep ties.  
 
Trade and investment 
China’s trade with the region has increased 
sevenfold over the last decade. China’s trade 
with Papua New Guinea alone increased 
tenfold between 2001 and 2011 to US$1.265 
billion.23 Impressive though this is, China’s 
trade with other parts of the world has 
increased by bigger factors over the same 
period; for example, China’s trade with the 
African continent increased by a factor of 
fifteen  – from US$10.6 billion in 2000 to 
US$160 billion in 2011.24 Increased Chinese 
trade was partly facilitated by China’s entry 
into the World Trade Organization, which 
marked the start of a policy of much deeper 
integration of the Chinese economy into the 
global economy.  
 
But even as China has become the region’s 
second largest bilateral two-way trading 
partner, it is still a long way behind Australia. 
According to ANZ Bank statistics, China’s 
exports to the Pacific in 2011 totalled US$897 
million, well behind Australia’s US$2.6 billion 
and Singapore’s US$1.98 billion. The Pacific’s 
exports to China in 2011 totalled US$1.17 
billion, while the region’s exports to Australia 
in 2011 totalled US$4.14 billion.25 The 
European Union was the second biggest export 
market for the Pacific, with exports valued at 
US$1.54 billion. The growth in exports from 
Asian countries such as Singapore, China and 
Malaysia to the Pacific Islands region has been 
higher than the growth in exports from 
Australia; illustrating the growing importance 
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Source: Paul Gruenwald and Daniel Wilson, Pacific trade –
who should be targeted in Emerging Asia? ANZ Research 
Article, 16 August 2012. 
 
Source: Paul Gruenwald and Daniel Wilson, Pacific trade –
who should be targeted in Emerging Asia? 
 
Chinese companies and investors in the Pacific 
Islands, mostly from provincial centres in 
China, have expanded beyond their traditional 
small retail business focus to the domain of 
infrastructure and mining. The rise of China’s 
investment in the region has been most visible 
in Papua New Guinea, where it has been driven 
in large part by a desire to secure access to that 
country’s vast natural resources. For example, 
China’s Metallurgical Group Corporation has 
invested in the Ramu Nickel Project in 
Madang, Papua New Guinea, the largest 
Chinese investment in the region. Chinese 
construction companies are growing in number 
and influence in the region, with a particularly 
strong presence in Papua New Guinea and also 
in Fiji. Chinese companies have been 
responsible for the construction of roads in 
Central, Gulf, Morobe and Madang provinces 
and the construction of student dormitories at 
the University of Goroka in Papua New 
Guinea.  
 
Chinese companies often work in cooperation 
with other foreign investors and multinational 
partners to complete projects in the Pacific 
Islands.27 They also compete for and win World 
Bank and Asian Development Bank tenders in 
the Pacific Islands, which demand levels of 
transparency not previously associated with 
Chinese activities in the region. This aspect of 
Chinese commercial activities further 
complicates the perception that Chinese actors 
in the region are inherently different from 
Western actors.  
 
Chinese investment also needs to be seen in the 
context of the activities of other foreign 
investors. It is difficult to collect reliable data 
on foreign direct investment in the Pacific 
Islands, in part due to weaknesses in Pacific 
Island government collecting agencies and a 
lack of transparency from some investors. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that there is growing 
diversity in an investment scene once 
dominated by Australia and New Zealand. 
There are a number of new external players in 
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the resource, aviation and communication 
fields. The Irish telecommunications company, 
Digicel, has invested in the mobile phone 
markets of most Pacific Island countries and 
has driven a revolution in communications in 
the region.28 Energy companies from France 
have investments in Fiji and Papua New Guinea 
as well as the French Pacific. 
 
In Papua New Guinea, the United States oil and 
gas giant Exxon Mobil has a US$19 billion 
investment in an integrated liquefied natural 
gas development in the Southern Highlands and 
Western Provinces that outstrips any other 
private sector investment in the region. Papua 
New Guinea hosts a range of other Asian 
investments, including a South Korean cassava 
ethanol project and a Japanese cement 
company. Malaysian companies dominate the 
logging sector in Papua New Guinea, and also 
have substantial interests in the palm oil 
industry, property, retail and media. The tuna 
processing industry has attracted investment 
from companies in the Philippines, South 
Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and China. Japanese 
company Yazaki is the largest private sector 
employer in Samoa. The Malaysian company 
MBf Holdings has investments across a range 
of industries in Fiji, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu 
and Tonga as well as Papua New Guinea. The 
participation of Chinese businesses in a 
competitive economic environment is not 
evidence of a threat to the established geo-
strategic order.  
 
Aid 
Samoan Prime Minister Tuilaepa, an outspoken 
but generally conservative and pro-United 
States leader, said in an interview in June 2012 
that he considered China a better friend to 
Pacific countries than the United States. He 
accused the United States of showing a lack of 
interest in the South Pacific and said China 
filled a gap that Australia and New Zealand 
could not by being flexible about aid delivery.29 
Most Pacific Island leaders take a similar view 
on the opportunities offered by China. 
 
China’s aid spending in the Pacific Islands tends 
to be highly visible as it has generally focused 
on infrastructure such as roads, bridges and 
government buildings. China’s aid is frequently 
invoked by analysts and Pacific Island 
politicians and officials as evidence that China 
has strategic ambitions to replace the West by 
filling a gap left by the established donors. This 
interpretation would, however, appear to 
overestimate the actual quantum and intent of 
China’s development assistance spending in the 
region.  
 
The Chinese government characterises its 
spending on development as ‘South-South 
cooperation’ rather than traditional official 
development assistance. ‘South-South 
cooperation’ is portrayed as a framework for 
collaboration among developing countries in 
various fields including economic, political, 
social, environmental and technical, and is 
meant to take the form of a partnership where 
knowledge and skills are shared to promote 
development. Such altruistic explanations 
should not always be accepted at face value. 
China’s aid often ends up supporting China’s 
own economic development through 
investment in projects that deliver contracts to 
Chinese companies and employment to Chinese 
nationals. Pacific Island workers, who tend to 
be excluded from opportunities to work on 
infrastructure projects funded by Chinese grant 
aid, may not see these projects as partnerships. 
Moreover, as is the case for many other donors 
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in the Pacific, Chinese aid is sometimes 
delivered with an expectation that the recipient 
country will be grateful enough to support a 
Chinese candidature in international 
organisations or the Chinese position on a vote 
in the United Nations. 
 
There is no single centralised aid agency in 
Beijing coordinating China’s development 
assistance. Aid is typically delivered through a 
combination of grants and interest free loans, 
both managed by China’s Ministry of 
Commerce (MOFCOM), and concessional 
loans, extended from China’s Export Import 
(EXIM) Bank. China also provides other forms 
of development finance, which it does not 
classify as aid. Scholarships and technical 
assistance are generally extended through 
individual line ministries in China. Chinese 
diplomatic missions in the Pacific Islands have 
small discretionary aid allocations. 
Concessional loans dominate the dollar value 
of China’s aid to the Pacific, but grants are 
responsible for the majority of individual aid 
projects.  
 
Graeme Smith of the University of Sydney 
makes a compelling argument that it is ‘Chinese 
infrastructure companies in the Pacific Islands, 
not aid agencies in Beijing’ that are responsible 
for driving aid.30 There is in fact very limited 
knowledge in the central government agencies 
of Beijing of the Pacific Islands region. Forty 
per cent of China’s global foreign aid 
expenditure is for construction projects in 
which China provides some or all of the 
financing, services, materials and labour.31 
China’s aid in the Pacific Islands is increasingly 
focused on Papua New Guinea, where the 
greatest number of opportunities for Chinese 
construction, manufacturing and mining 
companies reside. It is these commercially-
driven, albeit mostly state-owned, entities 
which are advocating for the attention of the 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce and the China 
Exim Bank in the Pacific Islands to ensure they 
have the right support to compete for tenders 
and expand their market share. 
 
It is true, however, that there remain different 
interpretations of the motivations behind 
Chinese aid disbursement in the Pacific Islands, 
including in research conducted by the Lowy 
Institute on the subject in the past.32 The 
opaque nature of the agencies responsible for 
delivering aid and lack of clarity around 
Chinese aid activities have complicated these 
debates and have made it difficult to make 
accurate estimates of annual aid totals. But as 
China matures as a donor, it has gradually 
released more information about the delivery of 
its aid, while the OECD and other donors have 
been able to gain a better understanding of 
Chinese aid policy through discussions with 
Chinese officials. China’s first ever White Paper 
on Foreign Aid in 2011 published a 
geographical distribution of its foreign aid 
funds for 2009, which showed that 4 per cent 
of its total went to 12 countries in Oceania, 
compared to 45.7 per cent devoted to Africa, 
32.8 per cent to Asia and 12.7 per cent to the 
Caribbean.33 In April 2013 the Chinese 
government announced for the first time ever 
an annual figure (US$6.4 billion) for its total 
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Source: China’s Information Office of the State Council, 
China’s foreign aid, 2011. 
 
According to published and forthcoming 
research conducted by the Lowy Institute’s 
Philippa Brant, China disbursed approximately 
US$850 million in bilateral aid to the eight 
Pacific Island countries which recognise the 
People’s Republic of China between 2006 and 
2011.35 Brant's research was based on a 
comprehensive, detailed survey of Pacific Island 
budgets and government reports, information 
from China's Ministry of Commerce, and 
interviews with Pacific Island and Chinese 
government officials. She argues that the 
complex and various methods of disbursement 
of China’s aid in Pacific Islands make it 
difficult to extract accurate annual expenditure 
figures per country and a five-year total is more 
likely to be an accurate representation of 
Chinese expenditure on aid. 
 
Using a five-year total to compare donors 
shows that even with its impressive rise in 
profile as an aid giver in the region, China is 
very far from challenging Australia’s 
overwhelmingly dominant position. As 
reflected in the graph below, Australia is by far 
the lead donor in the region, disbursing US$4.8 
billion over five years, followed by the United 
States (US$1.27 billion), New Zealand 
(US$899.3 million), Japan (US$868.8 million), 
China (US$850 million), France (US$718. 
million) and European Union institutions 
(US$595.8 million).36 
 
Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System, Dr Philippa Brant. 
 
In fact nothing illustrates Australian 
predominance in the Pacific Islands better than 
its aid commitment to the region. In the 2012-
13 financial year Australia committed A$1.19 
billion to the Pacific Islands, A$829.5 million 
of which is being spent in Melanesia alone.37 In 
2011, the last year for which comparable 
statistics for other OECD donors are available, 
Australia's net disbursements totalled 
US$1.209 billion, which respectively 
constituted 62 per cent and 55 per cent of the 
bilateral and the total aid received by the 
region.38 There is no other region in the world 
where a donor dominates to the extent that 
Australia does in the Pacific. The next highest 
‘market’ dominance is in the Middle East, 
where US aid constitutes 51 per cent of the 
total bilateral overseas development assistance 
(ODA) received by the region.39 
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Source: OECD Development Assistance Committee, 
Development aid at a glance: statistics by region – Oceania. 
 
Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System 
 
 
Diplomatic and military ties 
China maintains diplomatic missions in most of 
the countries which recognise it in the region. 
Chinese diplomats, like diplomats from many 
nations, leverage Chinese contributions to 
development in the region to shore up support 
with Pacific Island governments for China’s 
international positions. But in the competitive 
vote-buying environment that exists in the 
Pacific Islands, there is no evidence yet to 
suggest that Pacific Islands are being 
particularly swayed by China.  
 
China has not yet sought to project hard power 
into the Pacific Islands region. Two Chinese 
naval vessels (the training vessel Zhenghe and 
the frigate, Mian Yang) paid a goodwill visit to 
the region in 2010, stopping in Tonga, 
Vanuatu, and Papua New Guinea before 
heading to Australia and New Zealand. While 
this may signal longer-term military interests in 
the region, rumours about China setting up 
military bases in island states have not come to 
fruition. Senior Chinese military officers have 
paid visits to regional counterparts, provided 
military uniforms, vehicles and other non-lethal 
equipment and refurbished barracks in Fiji, 
Papua New Guinea and Tonga. While China 
has been criticised for supporting the military-
led regime in Fiji, the nature of the military 
support it has made available to Fiji has been 
no different from that offered to Papua New 
Guinea and Tonga.  
 
Indeed, once again, China’s diplomatic and 
military ties in the region lag well behind those 
of the existing powers. Australia remains the 
key security partner for many countries in the 
region and bears much of the security 
responsibility for the South Pacific, which is 
identified as one of four key strategic interests 
in the Defence White Paper, launched in May 
2013. It commits Australia to implement the 
Pacific Maritime Security Program (replacing 
the Pacific Patrol Boat Program) to assist 
Pacific Island countries manage their exclusive 
economic zones. The Australian Defence Force 
maintains a A$21 million Defence Cooperation 
Program with Papua New Guinea, comprising 
training, exercises, technical advice and 
infrastructure upgrades.40 In the wider Pacific 
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Islands (excepting Fiji), the A$31 million 
Australian Defence Cooperation Program 
assists defence and police forces through the 
provision of advisers, capability and 
infrastructure development, and support for 
participation in exercises.  
 
The United States’ principal interests lie in the 
northern Pacific. The state of Hawaii is 
headquarters to the United States military 
presence in the region known collectively as the 
U.S. Pacific Command. The United States 
maintains three flag territories, American 
Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern 
Mariana Islands, and Guam, and has Compacts 
of Free Association with the Federated States of 
Micronesia, Palau and the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands. But despite its enduring 
official presence, the United States is perceived 
to have long been a silent partner in the 
southwest Pacific, and has looked to its close 
ally Australia to uphold their broadly mutual 
strategic interests. 
 
New Zealand’s influence is strongest in 
Polynesia and is amplified by its working 
closely with Australia across the region and in 
regional fora. In security terms, it provides for 
the defence of the Cook Islands, Niue and 
Tokelau. France’s territorial interests in New 
Caledonia, French Polynesia, and Wallis and 
Futuna give it long-term responsibilities in the 
region. French defence forces, based in New 
Caledonia, provide the security guarantee for 
the French Pacific. France now cooperates 
actively with Australia and New Zealand on 
defence, disaster relief and regional maritime 
surveillance. Japan interacts with the region 
primarily through its triennial Pacific Island 
Leaders Meeting (PALM), through its aid 
program and through trade and investment. It 
also consults regularly with Australia.  
 
The stance of Pacific Island states to these 
established powers often reflects the somewhat 
fractious attitudes that result from close and 
long-standing familiarity. Nevertheless, most of 
the Island states in the region (with the possible 
exception of Fiji) are not seeking to change the 
existing order, even if they could, although they 
are keen to attract new external aid and 
commercial partners. Their attitude was best 
summed up by Papua New Guinea Prime 
Minister Peter O’Neill, in an address to the 
Lowy Institute on 29 November 2012. He said 
that Papua New Guinea’s paramount strategic 
and security relationships were with Australia 
and the United States but that his country 
would continue to look for economic growth 
opportunities in Asia, as well as in Australia.41  
 
 
Economic not geo-strategic competition 
 
It could be argued that while viewing China’s 
growing presence in the Pacific Islands through 
a paradigm of geo-strategic competition may 
not be entirely accurate, it is prudent given the 
uncertainty surrounding China’s future 
trajectory. The problem is that relying on a 
geo-strategic paradigm obscures a better 
understanding of both the benefits and 
drawbacks of China’s current economic and 
commercially-led aid activities in the region, 
and perhaps even obstructs the management of 
these activities. In that regard, in analysing the 
changing dynamics of the Pacific Islands region, 
it is important to be clear about the difference 
between normal economic competition and 
competition for strategic influence derived from 
diplomatic, defence and aid links.  
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The real competition in the Pacific Islands 
region is economic, even if China, with its 
‘South-South cooperation’ approach to 
development assistance and with the influence 
of Chinese commercial interests on its decisions 
about aid expenditure, often blurs the 
distinction between economic and development 
activities. The last five to ten years have seen an 
increase in international interest in the 
resources of the Pacific Islands to meet global 
demand. Private sector competition for those 
resources has intensified. Papua New Guinea 
hosts a range of investment partners, who 
compete for the country’s abundant and 
valuable resources. Competition over Pacific 
Island fisheries is fierce, and, despite the efforts 
of the various agencies established to control 
the sector, it is difficult for Pacific Island 
countries to realise the full value of this 
valuable resource. The Pacific Islands Forum 
Fisheries Agency estimates the dollar value of 
the fisheries catch from the Pacific Islands 
region (including national and international 
waters) at approximately US$5 billion (in 
2010).42 There are also prospects, as yet 
unrealised, for deep-sea mining across the 
region, which is likely to provoke competition.  
 
The proximity of the Pacific Islands to 
resource-hungry East Asia will be very 
advantageous for the region over the long term. 
Already, this rise in demand for the resources 
of Melanesia in particular has seen regional 
annual GDP growth rates over the last decade 
that are higher than the global average. China’s 
own experience in lifting millions of people out 
of poverty can serve as inspiration to Pacific 
Island countries in ways that the region’s 
established powers cannot. But it would be a 
mistake to think, as some Pacific Island 
governments do, that any and all foreign 
interest, including that of China, in the Island 
states should be welcomed simply because they 
contribute to the public purse.  
 
China’s loans to various Pacific Island countries 
have created debt burdens. For example, the 
IMF has assessed Tonga at being at high risk of 
debt distress due to two loans it has from 
China’s EXIM bank. The loans, for the 
reconstruction of the capital, Nuku’alofa, and 
for roads, account for 61 per cent of Tonga’s 
external debt, which in turn amounts to about 
41 per cent of GDP, putting the external debt 
well above the present value of the debt-to-
export distress threshold over the medium 
term.43 
 
The commercial interests of foreign logging and 
mining companies have in some cases imposed 
lasting damage on the environments, and 
therefore the livelihoods, of communities in 
Melanesia. Moves by foreign firms, including 
Chinese-owned entities, into rural business 
sectors have caused some consternation in the 
islands. The Vanuatu government has discussed 
imposing restrictions on foreign investment to 
stop Chinese businesses dominating its retail 
sector.44  
 
Large and small companies from China or 
other nations which favour employment of 
their nationals over locals are failing to meet 
local community expectations of benefits from 
investment. Resentment against Chinese-owned 
businesses was a factor behind riots in 
Nuku’alofa in Tonga and Honiara in Solomon 
Islands in 2006 and in Papua New Guinea in 
2009. Frustrations about exclusion from job 
opportunities could resurface and be expressed 
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Managing the future 
 
Australia, the United States and other 
traditional powers in the region should be 
seeking to engage and cooperate with China on 
its commercial and development activities. The 
region faces massive development challenges, 
and with its sizeable resources and experience 
in lifting millions of people out of poverty, 
China can a make a significant contribution to 
addressing them. But as a relatively recent and 
still inexperienced donor and investor in the 
region, China would benefit from the 
experience of countries such as Australia. The 
challenge therefore will be to build the 
appropriate framework through which this can 
occur. 
 
This is easier said than done. China has been 
reluctant to cooperate with other donors in the 
past. Australia established the Cairns Compact 
on Strengthening Development Co-operation at 
the 2009 Pacific Islands Forum in Cairns. The 
Compact was designed to facilitate cooperation 
amongst the region’s donors and development 
partners but China declined to join. Wang 
Yongqiu, the senior Chinese delegate in Cairns, 
explained China’s reluctance to participate in 
the Compact in a media interview: 
 
‘We have different approaches and practices 
from Western developed countries. We feel 
it is unnecessary to accept this multilateral 
co-ordination mechanism, but we need time 
to study it. China is open and transparent in 
providing aid.’45 
 
Australia and New Zealand continued to press 
for China to participate in the Cairns Compact, 
to no avail. At the Pacific Islands Forum Post-
Forum Dialogue in Auckland in 2011, Chinese 
Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Cui Tiankai 
said ‘there was a difference between the aid 
China gave as a developing nation out of 
friendship and that of developed countries such 
as New Zealand, and Australia (which are 
extended) under commitments’.46 
 
There are a number of possible reasons why 
China was unwilling to participate. It probably 
did not want its records on aid to the Pacific 
subjected to the rigours of transparency 
required by the Compact. Nor did it necessarily 
want to abide by rules it had no hand in 
negotiating. It may have also believed that its 
mechanisms of delivering aid were simply too 
different to fit into a framework set up to suit 
the region’s established donors. Australia is 
right to insist that China needs to be more 
transparent about its aid activities in the 
Pacific. But ultimately it is also in the interest of 
established donors to bring China into regional 
arrangements such as the Cairns Compact and 
this probably means showing more flexibility 
and understanding of China’s position as a 
relatively new aid giver. Otherwise, it will be 
difficult to move beyond the somewhat circular 
discussion between governments about the true 
intention of Chinese aid. This discussion, often 
played out in the public arena, only fuels 
mistrust between China and other donors and 
prevents cooperation on aid projects that may 
actually help to break down suspicion. It is in 
this context in particular that viewing Chinese 
activities in the Pacific Islands from a starting 
point of geo-strategic competition is counter-
productive.  
 
The private sector has demonstrated in the 
Pacific Islands that cooperation between 
organisations with different nationalities, 
philosophies and modus operandi can work in 
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partnership to achieve common objectives. 
Chinese companies already work in partnership 
with Australian, French and local companies to 
deliver projects in the Pacific.  
 
The Cook Islands and New Zealand have also 
proved that aid cooperation with China is 
possible. In a world first, the Cook Islands 
instigated trilateral cooperation on a NZ$60 
million project in 2012 to improve water 
quality in Rarotonga. That said, this initiative 
came about for a number of reasons that are 
not easily replicated by others. China had 
offered the Cook Islands a NZ$32 million 
concessional loan for the project years earlier. 
The Cook Islands, which has a special 
relationship with New Zealand, proposed to 
involve New Zealand as a means of improving 
the effectiveness of the project. New Zealand, 
which also has a very positive relationship with 
China (it is the first developed country to have 
signed a free trade agreement with China), 
contributed NZ$15 million towards the cost of 
the project and the Cook Islands government 
also contributed.47 Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton praised the initiative as a model the 
United States could follow.48  
 
The Australian Government has made some 
positive strides in broadening and deepening its 
relationship with China. In April 2013, it 
agreed a Strategic Partnership with China that 
comprises an annual Foreign and Strategic 
Dialogue and an annual Strategic Economic 
Dialogue. Australia and China could use this 
dialogue to share views on development 
priorities in the Pacific Islands. Substantive 
discussions about the Pacific that focus on 
tackling serious development challenges in the 
region collaboratively with Pacific Island states, 
rather than on persuading China to join 
existing Australian initiatives such as the Cairns 
Compact, would probably be more constructive 
for the Island countries. It should serve to build 
trust and could help to assuage any Chinese 
suspicions of external manipulation. 
 
The new Australia-China Development 
Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding, 
also signed in April 2013, is meant to enable 
the two countries to cooperate on aid initiatives 
including regional health issues and water 
resource management.49 Cooperation with 
China in the aid sector is difficult and this 
MOU represents a very valuable start to 
building a new relationship in the region, based 
on a higher degree of trust between Australia 
and China. 
 
The inaugural South Pacific Defence Ministers’ 
Meeting, held on 2 May 2013, which included 
participation from Australia, New Zealand, 
Papua New Guinea, Tonga, France and Chile, 
agreed it was important to build the awareness 
of the region’s traditional and new partners 
around the region’s unique security challenges. 
The meeting suggested certain new states could 
be invited to observe existing regional military 
activities and exercises, and declared 
humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and 
maritime surveillance as particularly important 
in this regard.50 
 
Encouraging wider cooperation on disaster 
response preparedness exercises would be a 
constructive and non-politicised means of 
breaking down barriers between Pacific Island 
countries and its established and newer 
partners, and help Pacific Islanders to become 
more resilient. Natural disasters are crises that 
befall almost all Pacific Island countries on a 
regular basis, so there are many opportunities 
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to put coordinated planning into practice. 
These exercises can be organised bilaterally and 
regionally, and if initiated by Pacific Island 
countries or regional bodies, China is more 
likely to be attracted to participating.  
 
Australia, New Zealand and France already 
have in FRANZ a useful mechanism that assists 
Pacific Island countries in disaster response, but 
there is scope for more partners to assist. China 
has offered cash grants and in-kind donations 
to Pacific Island governments following past 
natural disasters. As there are now a large 
number of Chinese engineering firms based in 
the Pacific, China’s role in disaster response 
could involve in-kind assistance provided by 
these firms to repair infrastructure. Building 
effective models of cooperation in this field 
would help all partners act as responsible 
stakeholders which are responsive to the 
priorities of Pacific Island countries. They 
would also lessen the chances of 
misinterpreting the motivations of external 





The fact that China seems to have permeated 
both the regional consciousness and 
international thinking about the Pacific Islands 
is probably a reflection of wider concerns about 
the rise of China rather than the reality of its 
current presence in the region. China is a very 
long way from approaching Australia’s 
dominance of the aid, trade and strategic 
domains in the Pacific Islands region or 
displacing the United States as the dominant 
military power from the north. If China’s aims 
in the region are to be described in terms of 
geo-strategic competition, then on the available 
evidence, China is not a particularly committed 
competitor. 
 
Hillary Clinton was right when she said the 
Pacific was ‘big enough for all of us’. However, 
this concept needs to be extended beyond the 
security narrative in which it was cast. 
Australia and the United States should 
cooperate with China in areas that support 
Pacific Island economic and development 
priorities rather than building any new security 
or diplomatic infrastructure designed to 
compete with China. This will help to 
maximise the benefits of China’s new role in 
the region, while helping to minimise the 
negative consequences that do flow from some 
of China’s commercial and development 
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